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ABSTRACT
Real-time bidding (RTB) is an important mechanism in online dis-
play advertising, where a proper bid for each page view plays
an essential role for good marketing results. Budget constrained
bidding is a typical scenario in RTB where the advertisers hope
to maximize the total value of the winning impressions under a
pre-set budget constraint. However, the optimal bidding strategy
is hard to be derived due to the complexity and volatility of the
auction environment. To address these challenges, in this paper,
we formulate budget constrained bidding as a Markov Decision
Process and propose a model-free reinforcement learning frame-
work to resolve the optimization problem. Our analysis shows that
the immediate reward from environment is misleading under a
critical resource constraint. Therefore, we innovate a reward func-
tion design methodology for the reinforcement learning problems
with constraints. Based on the new reward design, we employ a
deep neural network to learn the appropriate reward so that the
optimal policy can be learned effectively. Different from the prior
model-based work, which suffers from the scalability problem, our
framework is easy to be deployed in large-scale industrial applica-
tions. The experimental evaluations demonstrate the effectiveness
of our framework on large-scale real datasets.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Information systems→ Computational advertising; • The-
ory of computation→ Reinforcement learning;
KEYWORDS
RTB; Display advertising; Bid optimization; Reinforcement learning
ACM Reference Format:
Di Wu, Xiujun Chen, Xun Yang, Hao Wang, Qing Tan, Xiaoxun Zhang,
Jian Xu, Kun Gai. 2018. Budget Constrained Bidding by Model-free Re-
inforcement Learning in Display Advertising. In The 27th ACM Interna-
tional Conference on Information and Knowledge Management (CIKM ’18),
October 22–26, 2018, Torino, Italy. ACM, New York, NY, USA, 9 pages.
https://doi.org/10.1145/3269206.3271748
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or
classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed
for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation
on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than the
author(s) must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or
republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission
and/or a fee. Request permissions from permissions@acm.org.
CIKM ’18, October 22–26, 2018, Torino, Italy
© 2018 Copyright held by the owner/author(s). Publication rights licensed to ACM.
ACM ISBN 978-1-4503-6014-2/18/10. . . $15.00
https://doi.org/10.1145/3269206.3271748
1 INTRODUCTION
In recent years, online display advertising has become one of the
most influential businesses, with $17.6 billion revenues in HY 2017
in US alone[1]. Real-Time Bidding (RTB) [28, 30] is probably the
most important mechanism in online display advertising. In RTB,
the advertisers have the ability to bid for an ad impression oppor-
tunity and only the highest bidder wins the opportunity to display
its ad. The winning advertiser has the privilege to enjoy the value
of the ad impression but with a certain cost. The impression value
is usually associated with the expectation of the desired outcomes
such as ad clicks or conversions. The cost is usually determined
based on the specific auction mechanism adopted. In this paper,
without loss of generality, we focus our discussion under the sec-
ond price auction [12] where the winning advertiser is charged the
second highest bid in the auction. Our approach is also applicable
under other auction mechanisms such as Vickrey-Clarke-Groves
auction (VCG) [25].
In RTB, a typical optimization goal for the advertisers is to maxi-
mize the total value of winning impressions under a certain budget.
Budget constrained bidding is an automated bidding strategy to
address this need. The advertisers can simply set their optimiza-
tion goal such as maximizing total ad clicks or conversions with
a certain budget and the bidding strategy is able to calculate the
bid for each ad impression opportunity on behalf of the advertisers
to achieve their optimization goal. This bidding strategy, which
significantly simplifies marketing strategy and improves marketing
efficiency, is widely provided by many global advertising platforms
such as Google, Facebook, and Alibaba.
Budget constrained bidding is essentially a knapsack problem[21],
and Zhang et al. [31] gave the theoretical proof that the optimal
bid takes the form of v/λ under the second price auction mecha-
nism, where v is the impression value and λ is a scaling parame-
ter mapping v to a scale of bid. This bidding formula has a very
straightforward interpretation: the larger the impression value is,
the higher the bid should be offered, and the impression value is
scaled by a parameter λ to derive the bid. A high λ may cause a
low bid, which might be lower than the optimal one, so that budget
may not be fully spent. On the contrary, a low λ may make the
bid higher than the optimal one and budget may run out early
so that potentially more valuable impressions may be missed. Un-
fortunately, it is extremely difficult to obtain the optimal λ in the
RTB environment. First, there are usually thousands or even more
heterogeneous bidders competing for the same ad opportunities
which makes the marketplace highly dynamic and unpredictable.
Second, the advertisers themselves may change campaign settings
such as budget and targeted audience.
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There are two categories of existingwork on resolving the budget
constrained bidding problem. The first category makes use of the
optimal bidding formula and dynamically tunes the parameter λ.
One solution is to use λ = f (budдet), and this comes from the
observation that the value of λ determines the budget spending
speed, and thus budget spending speed should be used as a signal to
adjust λ. However, how to determine the best budget spending speed
is still an open question [33]. The second category formulates the
auction process as a Markov Decision Process (MDP) [27], where an
action in theMDP is to generate a bid. Based on this formulation, Cai
et al. [8] tried to use reinforcement learning (RL) algorithms to solve
the budget constrained bidding problem. However, model-based RL
approaches such as [8] require storing the state transition matrix
and using dynamic programming algorithms, whose computational
cost is unacceptable in real-world advertising platforms.
In this paper, we propose a novel approach for budget con-
strained bidding by leveraging model-free reinforcement learning.
More specifically, we train an agent to sequentially regulate the
bidding parameter λ instead of directly producing bids. The agent
strives to learn and adapt to the highly non-stationary environment
in order to make λ always close to the optimal one. The appealing
properties of the approach is not only sticking to the theoretical
optimal bidding strategy but also avoiding expensive computational
cost brought by model-based RL approaches.
During the training process, we found that simply using imme-
diate reward will make the agent easily converge to suboptimal
solutions. This is mainly because the budget constraint is neglected
in the reward design. The immediate reward will simply make agent
obsessed with taking actions to decrease λ to gain more immediate
reward at each step. To address this challenge, we innovate a reward
designmethodology which leads the agent to efficiently converge to
the optimal solution. We also designed an adaptive ϵ-greedy policy
to adjust the exploration probability based on how the state-action
value is distributed. We conducted experiments on large-scale real
dataset, and observed improvements on the key metric compared
with the state-of-the-art RL-based bidding strategies. Our main
contributions can be summarized as follows:
(1) To the best of our knowledge, our work presents the first
model-free RL approach for the budget constrained bidding
problem. The approach demonstrates significant advantage
over existing heuristic or model-based RL approaches.
(2) A novel reward function design methodology is proposed to
lead the budget constrained bidding agent to its optimum
efficiently. This methodology can also be applied to other
scenarios involving resource-constrained RL.
(3) We invent a deep reinforcement learning to bid framework
that puts together the capabilities of deep neural networks,
model-free RL, and our policy optimization innovations. The
framework is already deployed and validated in industry-
scale advertising systems.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces
the budget constrained bidding problem and reinforcement learning
basics. In section 3, we present our model-free RL approach towards
the budget constrained bidding problem and give detailed analysis
on how to design reward function and improve ϵ-greedy policy.
Section 4 discusses the experimental evaluation results, followed
by related work in section 5. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 BACKGROUND
2.1 Budget Constrained Bidding
Budget constrained bidding is a typical strategy in RTB where the
advertisers hope to maximize the total value of winning impres-
sions under a budget. The bidding process of an advertiser can be
described as follows. During a time period, one day for instance,
there are N impression opportunities arriving sequentially ordered
by an index i . For simplicity, we slightly abuse the notations and
use the index i to represent the i-th impression opportunity. The
advertiser gives a bid bi according to the impression value vi and
competes with other bidders in real-time. If bi is the highest in the
auction, the advertiser has the privilege to display its ad and enjoys
the impression value. Winning an impression also associates with
a cost ci . In the second price auction, cost is determined by the
second highest bid in the auction. The bidding process terminates
whenever the total cost reaches the advertiser’s budget limit B or
all the impression opportunities have gone through the auction. Let
xi be a binary indicator whether the advertiser wins impression
i , the goal of budget constrained bidding is to maximize the total
value of winning impressions under the budget:
max
∑
i=1...N
xivi
s .t .
N∑
i=1
xici ≤ B
(1)
Lin et al. [21] formalized budget constrained bidding as a knap-
sack problem, and Zhang et al. [31, 32] proved that under the second
price auction, the optimal bidding strategy takes the form of
bi = vi/λ (2)
where λ is a scaling factor. When the impression opportunity se-
quence is known apriori, the optimal λ, say λ∗, can be derived
through greedy approximation algorithm [10]. Unfortunately, the
strategy needs to bid in real time without knowing the candidate
impressions, and the auction environment is usually highly non-
stationary due to the dynamics of all the participating bidders,
which makes λ∗ hard to obtain.
2.2 Reinforcement Learning and Constrained
Markov Decision Process
Reinforcement learning (RL) is a machine learning approach in-
spired by behaviorist psychology. In RL, an agent interacts with
its environment by sequentially taking actions, observing conse-
quences, and altering its behaviors in order to maximize a cumu-
lative reward. RL is usually modeled as a Markov Decision Process
(MDP) which consists of: a state space S = {s}, an action space
A = {a}, state transition dynamics T : S × A → P(S) where
P(S) is the set of probability measures on S, an immediate reward
function r : S × A → R, and a discount factor γ ∈ [0, 1]. A policy,
denoted by π : S → P(A) where P(A) is the set of probability
measures on A, fully defines the behavior of an agent. The agent
uses its policy to interact with the environment and gives a trajec-
tory of states, actions, and rewards s1,a1, r1, ..., sT ,aT , rT (T = ∞
indicates a infinite horizon MDP and otherwise an episodic one)
over S × A × R. The cumulative discounted reward constitutes
the return R =
∑T
t=1 γ
t−1rt . The agent’s goal is to learn an optimal
policy π∗ that maximizes the expected return from the start state.
π∗ = argmax
π
E[R |π ] (3)
Interacting with the environment may also incur costs ck :
S × A → R,k ∈ {1, ...,K} where ck is the cost of type k . Let
Ck =
∑T
t=1 γ
t−1ckt be the cumulative discounted cost of type k .
Constrained Markov Decision Process (CMDP) [3] extends MDP by
introducing additional constraints on the costs so that the policy
optimization problem can be written as
max
π
E[R |π ]
s .t . E(Ck |π ) ≤Ĉk ∀ k ∈ {1, ...,K}
(4)
where Ĉk is the constraint of type k cost.
3 METHOD
It is intuitive to model budget constrained bidding with CMDP
where the agent’s action is submitting bids to sequential impres-
sion opportunities and the constraint is the total budget. However,
this straightforward method is not feasible in the real applications.
First, policy optimization in CMDP is usually solved via model-
based RL approaches and more specifically via linear programming
[3, 11, 14, 16]. These approaches need to know (or predict) the
transition dynamics T apriori. However, the RTB environment is
highly non-stationary and unpredictable (as argued in Section 1)
which makes the transition dynamics hard to obtain. Second, these
approaches are also computationally costly and therefore are not
applicable in the RTB environment where there are typically bil-
lions of impression opportunities to bid for an advertiser on a daily
basis.
To tackle these challenges and inspired by the optimal bidding
theory [31], we propose to model budget constrained bidding as a
λ control problem in the CMDP framework and solve it via model-
free RL. More specifically, we employ deep Q-network (DQN) [24],
a variant of Q-learning as our RL algorithm. Q-learning iteratively
updates the action-value function Q(st ,at ) to quantify the quality
of taking action at at state st and DQN uses deep neural networks
to represent this function. We also find that the immediate reward
function will make the agent easily converge to suboptimal so-
lutions. This is mainly because the immediate reward function
neglects the budget constraint. To address this challenge, we inno-
vate a reward function design methodology for model-free RL to
solve the CMDP problem, which leads the agent to converge to the
optimal solution efficiently. Besides, we also improve the ϵ-greedy
policy in our scenario, helping the agent balance exploitation and
exploration.
3.1 Modeling
We consider an episodic CMDP with discount factor γ = 1 where
an episode (typically one day) starts with a budget B and an initial
λ0. As shown in Fig. 1, the agent regulates λ sequentially with a
Figure 1: Illustration of λ control process in budget con-
strained bidding. (A) Agent training process. (B) Agent on-
line predicting process.
fixed number of T steps (typically 15min between two consecutive
steps) until the episode ends. At each time step t ∈ {1, ...,T }, the
agent observes state st and takes an action at to adjust λt−1 to
λt . The bid for any impression opportunity i between time step
t and t + 1 is decided by vi/λt . The total value of the winning
impressions between t and t + 1 constitutes the immediate reward
rt , associated with a cost ct . The goal of the agent is to learn an
optimal λ control policy to maximize the cumulative reward
∑T
t=1 rt
as long as
∑T
t=1 ct ≤ B. More specifically, the core elements of the
CMDP are further explained as follows:
• S: The state should in principle reflect the RTB environment
and the bidding status. We consider the following statistics
to represent state st : 1) t : the current time step, 2) Bt : the
remaining budget at time-step t , 3) ROLt : the number of
λ regulation opportunities left at step t , 4) BCRt = (Bt −
Bt−1)/Bt−1: the budget consumption rate, 5)CPMt : the cost
per mille of impressions of the winning impressions between
t−1 and t , 6)WRt : the auction win rate reflecting the ratio of
winning impressions versus total impression opportunities,
and 7) rt−1: the total value of winning impressions such as
the total clicks or conversions at time-step t − 1.
• A: We design a number of adjustment rates to λ so that an
action a ∈ A typically takes the form of λt = λt−1 ×(1+ βa )
where βa is the adjustment rate associated with a.
• T : Since we take the model-free RL approach, we can derive
the policies without considering the transition dynamics.
• rt : The immediate reward at time step t is ∑i ∈It xivi where
It is the set of impression opportunities between time step t
and t + 1.
• c: Similar with the immediate reward definition, the cost
between time step t and t + 1 is
∑
i ∈It xici .• γ : We set reward(cost) discount factor γ = 1 since the op-
timization goal of the budget constrained bidding problem
is to maximize total reward value under the cost constraint
regardless of the reward (cost) time.
Deriving this episodic CMDP setup does not necessarilymean the
problem is solved. In fact, the immediate reward function will make
the agent converge to the suboptimal solution and the exploration
strategies in DQN is not efficient under some circumstances. In the
rest of this section, we focus our discussion on the reward function
design methodology and the exploration improvements.
3.2 Reward Function Design
3.2.1 The Reward Function Design Trap. In our problem mod-
eling, the immediate reward rt is the total value of winning im-
pressions between t and t + 1. It can be easily inferred that rt
monotonously increases as λt−1 decreases (and vice versa) as a
small λt−1 encourages an aggressive bidding and therefore wins
more impressions between step t − 1 and t . In this case, the agent
will be obsessed with taking actions to decrease λ and finally con-
verge to suboptimal solutions. The reason why the agent tends to
converge to suboptimal solutions is two-folded:
• Neglection of budget constraint: Budget is the critical
resource in budget constrained bidding. It is not difficult
to imagine that consuming too much budget acquiring im-
pressions at the beginning may not be the optimal strategy.
However, the immediate reward does not consider the budget
constraint at all.
• Policy greedy character andpoor exploration efficiency:
At the beginning of the DQN training process, reward rt will
significantly affect Q’s output, which makes Q tend to give
relatively higher output to the action receiving larger im-
mediate reward. As a result, the agent will hardly change
its inclination because there is no punishment in our formu-
lation1. Further the line, once the agent has the inclination
of consuming more budget at the beginning of the episode,
it becomes very hard to explore the optimal sequence of
actions, because the agent will miss the potentially more
valuable impressions later in the episode due to running out
of budget.
3.2.2 A Reward Design Methodology. It becomes crucial to de-
sign a new reward function that can avoid the drawbacks of the
immediate reward and is simple enough to boost the agent’s con-
vergence to the optimal one. Here “simple” means: 1) the reward
naturally encodes the constraint, 2) it is easy to implement, and 3)
it can be generalized to other scenarios beyond budget constrained
bidding. Let us take a look at the problem from another angle. In-
tuitively, the return of an entire episode will tell us how good the
agent does. We believe this would be a good reward for all the (s,a)
pairs in this episode (recall that an episode is a sequence of states,
actions, and rewards). In order to relieve the effect brought by other
state-action pairs2, we consider a new reward function design for
(s,a) with the form:
r(s,a) = max
e ∈E(s,a)
ΣTt=1r
(e)
t (5)
where E(s,a) represents the set of existing episodes that the agent
took action a at state s and r (e)t is the original immediate reward
at step t within episode e . We leverage the episodic nature of the
process so that new reward will be continuously updated during the
policy optimization. Please note that the methodology can be gen-
eralized into other resource-constrained RL problems such as the
1Existingwork in the CMDP framework to resolve this trap is introducing a punishment
factor α to integrate the cost into the reward function, i.e., r ′t =rt + αct . However,
deriving the right α can be another cumbersome task since it will take a lot of time to
balance α and final performance.
2The return of an episode is jointly decided by all the (s, a) pairs in it.
game Gold Miner3, in which the action results in more value in unit
time will be more rewarded with our reward design methodology.
One may have the concern that whether the optimal policy with
the new reward function is the same as the one with the original
immediate reward. Fortunately, they are the same as long as there
is only one initial state and the MDP is deterministic.
Theorem 3.1. Let π∗r be an optimal policy if the reward function
is r in our MDP formulation. If the deterministic MDP with fixed T
steps has only one initial state s1, π∗r is guaranteed to be an optimal
policy π∗r in the original MDP formulation with immediate reward
r .4
Proof. Let {(si ,π∗r (si ), r(si ,π∗r (si )))}, i = 1, ..,T be an episode
produced by policy π∗r with initial state s1, where π∗r (si ) is the action
taken at state si and T is the episode length. Let V πr denote the
return obtained when applying policy π to the MDP with reward
function r. Since the MDP has only one initial state, it can be
guaranteed that
r(si ,π∗r (si )) ≤ V π
∗
r
r ,∀i = 1, ..,T . (6)
where V π
∗
r
r is denoted as the maximal return if the reward function
is r . Therefore, we can infer thatV π
∗
r
r , i.e., the maximal return if the
reward function is r, is no larger than T ·V π ∗rr , i.e.,
V
π ∗r
r = Σ
T
i=1r(si ,π∗r (si )) ≤ T ·V π
∗
r
r , (7)
where equality holds if and only if r(si ,π∗r (si )) = V π
∗
r
r ,∀i = 1, ...,T .
On the other hand, the episode produced by π∗r has the maximal
return V π
∗
r
r . Therefore at each state of this episode, the reward r,
which is the maximal return of episodes according to Eq. (5), is also
V
π ∗r
r ,i.e.,
V
π ∗r
r = Σ
T
i=1r(si ,π∗r (si )) = T ·V π
∗
r
r (8)
Since π∗r is the optimal policy if the reward function is r, it
obtains the maximal value w.r.t. reward r. Thus we have
V
π ∗r
r ≥ V π
∗
r
r = T ·V π
∗
r
r . (9)
Based on Eqs. (7) and (9), we haveV π
∗
r
r = T ·V π
∗
r
r and r(si ,π∗r (si )) =
V
π ∗r
r ,∀i = 1, ..,T .
This means π∗r (si ) is also an optimal action if the reward function
is r for any state si . Therefore, the optimal policy with reward
function r is also optimal with reward function r . □
3.3 Adaptive ϵ-greedy Policy
We use DQN as our model-free RL algorithm and it is default to
uses ϵ-greedy policy to balance exploitation and exploration, i.e.,
the agent chooses action a∗ = argmaxa Q(s,a)with probability 1-ϵ
or otherwise takes a random action. ϵ is usually initialized with
a large value and gradually anneals to a small value over time.
However, how to set a proper annealing speed is critical: a high
annealing speed usually makes exploration insufficient while a low
one usually results in a slow policy convergence.
3https://www.crazygames.com/game/gold-miner
4We omit both the cost function c and constraint B because the optimal policy must
have met the budget constraint.
(a) (b)
Figure 2: Distribution examples of action-value Q during
training. (a) Normal distribution. (b) Abnormal distribution.
Fortunately, in the budget constrained bidding problem, the op-
timal bidding theory guarantees a fixed optimal λ∗t for each step
t ∈ {1, ...,T }. The optimal action at state st is to adjust λ as close
to λ∗t as possible, otherwise, the more deviating from the optimal
action, the more potential value should be got (lessQ value). There-
fore, based on the action spaceA we defined (i.e., a set of adjustment
rate {βa }), the action-value distributionQ(st ,at ) overA, sorted by
the action’s adjustment scale βa , should be unimodal, such as the
plot illustrated in Fig. 2a. When the distribution is not unimodal, e.g.
the plot in Fig. 2b, we believe the current estimation of Q is abnor-
mal and the ϵ should be increased to encourage more explorations
under this state. This simple yet efficient adaptive ϵ-greedy policy
usually works well in our practice with the budget constrained
bidding problem.
3.4 Deep Reinforcement Learning to Bid
Putting them together, we present our Deep Reinforcement Learn-
ing to Bid (DRLB) framework.
The framework is built on top of DQN[24], where the state-action
value function Q is given by a deep neural network parameterized
with θ . The process an agent interacting with the auction system
within the DRLB framework can be illustrated in Fig. 3. Based on
the adaptive ϵ-greedy policy, the agent takes an action at ∈ A
(adjusting λt−1 to λt ) under state st ∈ S at step t ∈ {1, ...,T }.
Then, bids are produced based on Eq. (2) with λt for the advertiser
to compete with other bidders. At step t + 1, the environment
returns rt+1 and st+1. The agent updates θ by performing a gradient
descent according to the loss calculated based on a mini-batch
of (s,a, s ′, r(s,a)) sampled from experience. The complete DRLB
framework is presented in Algo. 1.
One thing deserves particular attention is that, different from
immediate reward rt , our reward function rt is not directly observ-
able from the environment at each step. However, storing r(s,a) for
all the (s,a) pairs is not feasible for large-scale applications such as
in industry-level advertising systems. Therefore, we use another
deep neural network to predict it and the neural network is called
RewardNet in our framework. The RewardNet, parameterized with
η, is simultaneously learned with theQ function in the DRLB frame-
work. The algorithm used to learn this RewardNet is shown in Algo.
2.
ALGORITHM 1: Deep Reinforcement Learning to Bid
Initialize replay memory D1 to capacity N1;
Initialize Q with random weights θ ;
Initialize Q tarдet with weights θ− = θ ;
for episode = 1 to K do
Initialize λ0;
Bid with λ0 according to Eq. (2);
for t = 1 to T do
Update RewardNet (8-10 in Algo. 2);
Observe state st ;
Get action at from adaptive ϵ -greedy policy;
Adjust λt−1 to λt ;
Bid with λt according to Eq. (2);
Get rt from RewardNet;
Observe next state st+1;
Store (st , st+1, at , rt ) in D1;
Sample mini-batch of (sj , sj+1, aj , r j ) from D1;
if sj+1 is the terminal state then
Set yj = r j ;
else
Set yj = r j + γ maxa′ Q (sj+1, a′; θ−);
end
Perform a gradient descent step on (yj −Q (sj , aj ; θ ))2 with
respect to θ ;
Every C steps reset Q tarдet = Q ;
end
Store data for RewardNet;
end
ALGORITHM 2: Learning RewardNet
Initialize replay memory D2 to capacity N2;
Initialize reward network R with random weights η;
Initialize reward dictionary M to capacity N3;
for episode = 1 to K do
Initialize temporary set S;
Set V = 0;
for t = 1 to T do
if len(D2) > BatchSize then
Sample mini-batch of (sj , aj , M(sj , aj )) from D1;
Perform a gradient descent step on
(R(sj , aj ;η) − M(sj , aj ))2 with respect to the network
parameters η;
Observe state st ;
RL agent executes at in the Environment;
Obtain immediate reward rt from the Environment;
Set V = V + rt ;
Store pair (st , at ) in S;
end
for (sj , aj ) in S do
Set M(sj , aj ) = max(M(sj , aj ), V );
Store pair (sj , aj , M(sj , aj )) in D2;
if |M | > N3 then
Discard old key in M based on LRFU strategy [18];
end
end
Figure 3: Illustration of Deep Reinforcement Learning to
Bid.
4 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section, we present the empirical study of DRLB. First, the
experimental setup and implementation details of DRLB are intro-
duced. Then, we quantitatively compare DRLBwith several baseline
methods and the state-of-the-art method RLB[8] on two large-scale
datasets. Finally, we investigate the effectiveness of the reward
function design and the adaptive ϵ-greedy policy.
4.1 Experimental Setup
4.1.1 Dataset. We investigate the performance of DRLB on two
datasets. Dataset A is from a leading e-commerce advertising plat-
form in China. The dataset comprises 2 billion impressions and
their predicted CTR from 10 continuous days in Jan 2018. Dataset B
is from iPinYou5, augmented with the predicted CTR produced by
the same model used in [8]. For both of the two datasets, the first 7
days of data are used for training and the last 3 days of data are used
for evaluation. Each day comprises an episode and each episode
consists of 96 time steps (15 minutes between two consecutive time
steps).
It is worth noting that inDataset A, the bidding environment may
change significantly on a daily basis. For instance, the advertisers
of a certain e-commerce category, e.g. clothing, usually have to deal
with traffic bursts and highly competitive bids from other bidders on
certain holidays or festivals, such as Women’s Day. The campaign
settings such as budget are usually adjusted by the advertisers
according to such situations as well.
4.1.2 Evaluation Metrics. The goal of the budget constrained
bidding is to maximize the total value of winning impressions. The
impression value is usually associated with the expectation of the
desired outcomes such as ad clicks or conversions. The evaluation
metric can be defined as the total predicted CTR or the total real
clicks of winning impressions.
In Dataset A, the auction log contains both the winning impres-
sions and the lost impressions. Since the click event is not available
for those lost impressions, we consider using predicted CTR as the
impression value. Based on the predicted CTR vi and cost ci for
all candidate impressions at the end of the episode, it is easy to
get the theoretically best result R∗ using the optimal λ∗ calculated
with the greedy approximation algorithm [10]. Thus, the difference
between R∗ and the total value of the winning impressions R under
the current policy is a simple and effective metric to evaluate the
policy, denoted by R/R∗. In Dataset B, the click results for all the
5iPinYou dataset is available at http://data.computational-advertising.org
candidate impressions are known, so that the real click number
from winning impressions is a proper metric to evaluate different
methods.
4.1.3 Baseline Methods. We compare DRLB with the widely
used methods in the industry as well as the state-of-the-art method.
1) Fixed Linear Bidding (FLB) uses a fixed λ0 to linearly bid
according to Eq. (10), which is very straightforward and is widely
used in industry.
bid = vi/λ0 (10)
2) Budget Smoothed Linear Bidding (BSLB) [15] gives a
practical way of bidding under budget constraint. It combines the
classic bidding Eq. (10) with the current budget consumption infor-
mation ∆, which equals to episode time left ratio divided by budget
left ratio. When the budget left ratio is lower than the time left ratio,
the bid is decreased by adjusting the λ0 downward, otherwise, the
bid is increased to consume more budget.
bid = vi/(λ0 ∗ ∆) (11)
3) Reinforcement Learning to Bid (RLB) [8] is the state-of-
the-art algorithm for budget constrained bidding. RLB formalized
the auction process as a MDP where the agent needs to take action,
i.e., provide a bid, for every impression opportunity. The agent is
trained with a model-based RL approach to maximize total value of
winning impressions under a certain budget constraint.
4.1.4 Implementation Details of DRLB. In DRLB, we take a fully
connected neural network with 3 hidden layers and 100 nodes
for each layer as our state-action value function Q and another
identically structured neural network as the RewardNet. The mini-
batch size is set to 32 and the replay memory size is set to 100,000.
The agent has 7 candidate actions corresponding to 7 different λ
adjustment rates -8%, -3%, -1%, -0%, 1%, 3%, and 8% respectively. λ
is adjusted every time step. The initial value of ϵ in ϵ-greedy policy
is set to 0.9 and final value is set to 0.05. The ϵ at each step t is
empirically set as max(0.95 − rϵ × t , 0.05), where t is the time step
number and rϵ is the parameter controlling the annealing speed.
With the adaptive ϵ-greedy policy, if the distribution of action-
value Q is not unimodal w.r.t. the sorted adjustment rates, the
agent randomly chooses an action with probability ϵ = max(ϵ, 0.5).
Following the common practice of DQN, we set everyC = 100 steps
Q tarдet updates θ− with θ and the learning rate is set to 0.001 and
momentum is set to 0.95.
4.2 Evaluation Results on Dataset A
We first conduct experiments to compare the performance of FLB,
BSLB,RLB, and DRLB on Dataset A. Please note that FLB, BSLB
and DRLB require an initial λ0 at the beginning of each episode. A
heurestic to derive λ0 is to use the theorectially optimal λ∗prev of the
previous episode6. Due to the variance of auction environment and
campaign settings, the derived λ0 may deviate from the theoretically
optimal λ∗ of the current episode. To investigate the performance of
each method with different λ-deviations, quantified by (λ0−λ∗)/λ∗,
6Since we have the all the knowledge of the auction information in the experiment
data, we are able to derive the theoretically optimal λ∗ .
we divide all campaigns into 9 groups according to the λ-deviation
and evaluate the four methods in each group.
The experimental results are summarized in Table 1. DRLB al-
most outperforms FLB, BSLB and RLB in all 9 groups and the over-
all improvements over FLB, BSLB and RLB is 100.92%, 18.33% and
16.80% respectively. Moreover, as the λ-deviation increases, the per-
formance of all baselines degrades enormously while DRLB can still
obtain desirable performance. In the cases that the λ-deviation is
small, e.g.[ -20%, 0%), all methods can achieve decent performance.
In the groups where λ-deviation is large, DRLB shows particular
advantage over the baselines, which indicates its superior adapt-
ability even starting with a improper λ0. For instance, when the
λ-deviation lies in [-100%, -80%), the average R/R∗ of DRLB is 0.878
while that of FLB, BSLB and RLB is 0.436, 0.525 and 0.430 respec-
tively.
We analyse the experimental results as follows. Because the en-
vironment from testing data may deviate from training data heavily,
some statistics about the auction environment in the training data,
such as budget and market price distribution, may be invalid in the
testing data. FLB gives the worst performance since it uses a fixed
λ0 and is unaware of the dynamics of the auction environment.
Similarly, RLB is also insensitive to the variance of the auction
environment, because it assumes the market price distribution is
stationary and hence the bidding policy is calculated based on this
market price distribution.
Both BSLB and DRLB show the ability to cope with the envi-
ronment changes. However, DRLB is even better than BSLB due to
the following two reasons. First, BSLB only takes into considera-
tion budget and time, while DRLB could make full use of auction
information to enable accurate λ control. Second, according to Eq.
(11), BSLB is insensitive to the time elapse at the early stages of the
day and thus shows limited adaptability to the environment. As for
DRLB, it is always able to make timely reaction because the state
can represent the environment comprehensively.
4.3 Evaluation Results on Dataset B
We further compare DRLB with RLB on Dataset B. The results are
shown in Table 2. We can see that 5 out of 9 campaigns observe
improvements in terms of acquired clicks if the bidding strategy is
DRLB. The overall improvement is 4.3%. We are particularly inter-
ested in those campaigns that DRLB performs worse than RLB. A
straightforward observation is that DRLB usually performs worse
than RLB on campaigns with low AUCs. AUC is a popular indicator
to measure the CTR prediction accuracy. A low AUC usually sug-
gests a poor CTR prediction accuracy. Remember that DRLB bids
linearly with the predicted impression value, which is quantified
by the predicted CTR. Therefore it is not difficult to understand the
suboptimal performance of DRLB on campaigns with poor CTR
predictions. We argue that improving CTR prediction should be a
separate effort (and this is usually the practice in real advertising
systems) and the performance of DRLB can be directly improved if
the CTR prediction is improved.
4.4 Convergence Comparison with Immediate
Reward Function
In order to probe the agent behaviors with different reward func-
tion, i.e. RewardNet and immediate reward, we train two models
independently on Dataset A. One model deploys RewardNet, while
the other uses immediate reward. We dump the models every 10
episodes during the training process, and compare them on the
testing dataset. As illustrated in Fig. 4a, the model with RewardNet
yields satisfying R/R∗ of 0.893 within a small number of steps, while
the model with immediate reward gets stuck in some inferior policy
and yields poor R/R∗ of 0.418. The experimental results indicate
the effectiveness of RewardNet in leading the agent to the optimal
policy.
Furthermore, to represent the reward function design trap, we
depict a typical case of the immediate reward distribution, i.e. rt /R∗
over time step t ∈ [1, ...,T ], of agents trained with different reward
function, which is shown in Fig. 4b. The ideal immediate reward
distribution derived by the theoretically optimal λ∗ is also illustrated
as a reference. The results demonstrate that the model trained with
immediate reward is prone to obtaining more immediate reward
in the early steps, which exhausts the budget and results in poor
performance from a long-term view. In the case of RewardNet, the
reward distribution is similar to that with λ∗, which shows that
RewardNet helps the agent avoid greedy behavior and better utilize
the budget for overall benefits.
4.5 Effectiveness of the Adaptive ϵ-greedy
Policy
Experiments are performed to compare our adaptive ϵ-greedy pol-
icy with the original ϵ-greedy policy. We evaluate these policies in
settings with two different annealing rates, i.e. rϵ=2e-5 and rϵ=1e-
5 respectively. The results shown in Fig. 5 demonstrate that our
adaptive exploration policy helps the agent explore effectively and
achieve better performance in both settings. Specially, the adaptive
ϵ-greedy exploration enables fast convergence and significantly
outperforms the original ϵ-greedy in the setting with the higher
annealing rate. This indicates the superior efficiency of our ex-
ploration strategy in circumstance where training time is limited,
which is common in reinforcement learning problems.
5 RELATEDWORK
In RTB display advertising, there has been some work proposed to
estimate impression value, e.g. click-through rate (CTR)[22] and
conversion rate (CVR)[20], which helps to bid in the impression
level. The optimal strategy of advertisers is to bid truthfully ac-
cording to the estimated impression value under the second price
auction[17]. However, truthful bidding may deliver poor perfor-
mance considering repeated auctions and budget constraints in
real-world applications[32]. For instance, an advertiser may run
out of the budget so early in a day and miss the potentially valu-
able impressions afterwards by thuthful bidding. Perlich et al. [26],
Zhang et al. [32] and Cai et al. [8] proposed to optimize the bidding
strategy under budget constraints to maximize the accumulated
impression value on behalf of advertisers in display advertising
scenario. Static bid optimization frameworks proposed in [26] and
[32] set bids according to the static distribution of input data, which
Table 1: The R/R∗ improvements of DRLB over other three methods in 9 groups of λ deviation based on Dataset A.
λ Deviation Campaigns R/R
∗ Improvements of R/R∗
FLB BSLB RLB DRLB FLB BSLB RLB
[−100%,−80%) 43 0.436 0.525 0.430 0.878 101.38% 67.24% 104.19%
[−80%,−40%) 89 0.434 0.647 0.800 0.884 103.69% 36.63% 10.50%
[−40%,−20%) 66 0.697 0.901 0.927 0.945 35.58% 4.88% 1.94%
[−20%, 0%) 41 0.863 0.936 0.965 0.953 10.43% 1.82% -1.24%
[0%, 20%) 39 0.825 0.925 0.944 0.950 15.15% 2.70% 0.64%
[20%, 40%) 48 0.491 0.947 0.895 0.948 93.08% 0.11% 5.92%
[40%, 80%) 85 0.391 0.904 0.832 0.928 137.34% 2.65% 11.54%
[80%, 160%) 57 0.307 0.813 0.709 0.924 200.98% 13.65% 30.32%
[160%,∞) 32 0.291 0.668 0.618 0.904 210.65% 35.33% 46.28%
Average 0.526 0.807 0.791 0.924 100.92% 18.33% 16.80%
Table 2: Detailed AUC and real clicks for DRLB and RLB (T
= 1000 and c0 = 1/16) in Dataset B.
Campaign AUC RLB DRLB Improvements
1458 97.73% 473 474 0.2%
2259 67.90% 23 22 -4.3%
2261 62.16% 17 15 -11.8%
2821 62.95% 66 66 0%
2997 60.44% 119 117 -1.6%
3358 97.58% 219 225 2.7%
3386 77.96% 109 134 22.9%
3427 97.41% 307 310 1.0%
3476 95.84% 203 239 17.7%
Overall - 1536 1602 4.3%
cannot work well when the real data distribution deviates from
the assumed one. Cai et al. [8] proposed a reinforcement learning
approach that shows robustness to the non-stationary auction envi-
ronment, which shares some common thoughts with our work. We
both formulated the bidding process as a reinforcement learning
problem. However, Cai et al. [8] modeled the state transition via
auction competition and derived the optimal policy to bid for each
impression on a model-based MDP, which leads to massive compu-
tations when datasets get large. In our work, we transformed the
original bidding process to λ regulating, and proposed the model-
free MDP to derive the optimal policy for bidding.
There is also somework addressing bidding problem in situations
different from ours. Amin et al. [4] and Yuan et al. [29] proposed
model-based MDPs to set bids in sponsored search, where the de-
cision is made on key-word level. Ghosh et al. [13] optimized the
bidding strategy to guarantee a given number of impressions with a
given budget. Approaches proposed in [19], [7], [2] and [23] adjust
the pre-set bid to smooth the budget spending, which helps adver-
tisers to reach a wider range of audience accessible throughout a
day and have a sustainable impact. Moreover, some previous work
provide insights on the bidding mechanism design for the advertis-
ing platform[5, 6, 9], while our work focuses on the benefits of the
advertisers and aims to optimize their bidding results.
6 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose a model-free deep reinforcement learning
method to solve the budget constrained bidding problem in RTB
(a)
(b)
Figure 4: Comparison between RewardNet and immediate
reward. (a) The R/R∗ of two models over steps. (b) Reward
distribution of two models along with the ideal one in an
episode.
display advertising. The bidding problem is innovatively formulated
as a λ control problem based on linear bidding equation. To solve the
reward design trap, which makes the agent hard to converge to the
optimum, we design RewardNet to generate reward instead of using
the immediate reward. Furthermore, the problem of insufficient
exploration is also alleviated by dynamically changing the random
probability of the original ϵ-greedy policy. The experiments upon
the real-world dataset show that our model converges quickly and
significantly outperforms the widely used bidding methods. Last
(a)
(b)
Figure 5: Performance of adaptive ϵ -greedy and original ϵ -
greedy. (a) rϵ =2e-5. (b) rϵ =1e-5.
but not least, the idea of RewardNet is general, which can be applied
to other deterministic MDP problems, especially for those aiming
to maximize long-term result when the reward function is hard to
design.
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